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A CALL FOR REFORM OF RECENT IMMIGRATION
LEGISLATION
Jason H. Ehrenberg*
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 dramatically limit the
procedural rights of aliens who have been convicted of serious crimes. Conse-
quently, aliens who have immigrated to the United States to escape persecution in
their homelands are deported without adequate hearing or appeal. This Note ar-
gues that the laws violate international obligations and Constitutional law. It
advocates amending the laws to give the Attorney General discretion over deporta-
tion decisions, eliminating retroactive application of deportation for aggravated
felons, and reinstating judicial review of deportation or exclusion decisions.
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress passed two laws that drastically reformed im-
migration policy in the United States: the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)' and the Illegal Im-
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) . The Acts were aimed at alleviating the negative public
response to America's growing population of illegal immigrants.
Although the legislative history of the IIRIRA suggests more than
one purpose for the legislation,4 the most dramatic and significant
* Note Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 32, 1998. B.S.
1996, Cornell University; J.D. 1999, University of Michigan Law School. The author wishes
to thank Kendra Cheves and David Smith for their efforts in editing this Note and to ex-
press his gratitude to Ronald, Randy, and Eric Ehrenberg for their continuing love and
support.
1. Antiterorrism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter AEDPA].
2. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IIRIRA].
3. See William C.B. Underwood, Note, Unreviewable Discretionary Justice: The New Ex-
treme Hardship in Cancellation of Deportation Cases, 72 IND. L.J. 885, 885 (1997) (stating that
IIRIRA was passed to "address the public backlash against America's growing population of
illegal residents"). The AEDPA and IIRIRA amend certain provisions of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1954 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et. seq.).
4. The conference report stated the IIRIRA was enacted to:
amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to improve deterrence of illegal immi-
gration to the United States by increasing border patrol and investigative personnel,
by increasing penalties for alien smuggling and for document fraud, by reforming
exclusion and deportation law and procedures, by improving the verification system
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
reform measures fell under the category of exclusion and deporta-
tion law. As of April 1, 1997, immigrants seeking entry into the
United States face tougher entry requirements and have little or
no chance of obtaining judicial review of Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS) determinations which exclude them from
entering the country or deport them once already in the United
States! These new measures are draconian in nature and far ex-
ceed what was necessary to address the immigration problem.
In the mid-1990s illegal immigration was a significant issue in
the United States.6 Enforcement of the civil and criminal provi-
sions of immigration laws was an expensive task . Between four and
five million illegal aliens resided in the United States in 1996.8 It is
estimated that another 400,000 aliens gain access to the U.S. each
year.9 The economic and social costs created by illegal immigration
were great.'0 Congress saw a clear need to make border patrols
tougher and to make INS processes more efficient."
However, the measures taken by Congress far exceed what was
necessary to achieve those goals. They may create significant risks
that asylum seekers and refugees, fleeing religious and political
persecution, will be returned to their homelands to endure further
persecution." The measures deny immigrants judicial review of
INS deportation decisions.13 In this respect, certain provisions of
for the eligibility for employment, and through other measures, to reform the legal
immigration system and facilitate legal entries into the United States ....
H.R. CON. REP. No. 104-828, at 1 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Paul S. Jones, Note, Immigration Reform: Congress Expedites Illegal Alien Re-
moval and Eliminates Judicial Review from the Exclusion Process, 21 NOVA L. REv. 915, 919-20
(1997) (stating that INS decisions regarding deportation or exclusion are no longer subject
to judicial review).
6. See Dulce Foster, Note, Judge, Jury and Executioner: INS Summaly-Exclusion Power Un-
der the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 82 MINN. L. REV. 209,
210 (1997) (stating that few would argue that the government's focus on immigration policy
is misplaced and that Congress has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from
threats to national security); Jones, supra note 5, at 916 (noting that the economic costs of
illegal immigration may run as high as thirty billion dollars per year).
7. SeeJones, supra note 5, at 916-17 (suggesting that reimbursement from states such
as the request by Florida for reimbursement of one billion dollars it spent per year for edu-
cation, medical care, and a justice system for illegal immigrants prompted Congress to
make changes in the immigration laws).
8. See id. at 915.
9. See id. at 916.
10. See id. (stating that for every twenty undocumented aliens working in the United
States, thirteen Americans are out ofjobs, and that unemployment payments, services, and
lost taxes cost the government thirty billion dollars per year).
11. See H.R. CONy. REP. No. 104-828, at 1 (1996).
12. See Celia W. Dugger, In New Deportation Process, No Time, or Room, for Error, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1997, at Al.
13. See IIRIRA §§ 301 and 302; discussion infra Part I.C.
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the AEDPA and IIRIRA directly conflict with obligations estab-
lished under international law14 and with due process guarantees
found in the Constitution.15 Finally, the new laws illustrate the atti-
tude of this nation towards people in need: "How we treat asylum
seekers is a reflection of who we are as a nation.... The law was
not just for the benefit of the country. It was also supposed to help
those who needed help. That's where we have fallen short."' "
This Note discusses key provisions of the AEDPA and IIRIRA
that: (1) deny asylum seekers full hearings with legal representa-
tion; (2) expand the definition of aggravated felonies and other
criminal offenses; and (3) eliminate the right to judicial review of
many deportation decisions. Part I of the Note describes the key
provisions of the new legislation, sections 321, 305, 301, 302, and
306 of the IIRIRA, and section 440 of the AEDPA. Part II explores
recent case law dealing with these provisions. Part III advocates for
amendment of the AEDPA and IIRIRA. This Note will show that
these Acts will have profound effects on immigrants and their
families, and that the legislation violates both international law
and the Constitution of the United States.
I. KEY PROVISIONS OF IIRIRA AND AEDPA AND THEIR
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. IIRIRA Section 321(a)(3)
1. The Law-Section 321 (a) (3) of the IIRIRA amends the
definition of aggravated felony 7 as it appeared in the Immigration
14. More specifically, these provisions come in direct 'conflict with the United States'
obligations as established under the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (guaranteeing that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law); discussion infra Part I.B.2.
16. Mirta Ojito, Inconsistency at INS. Complicates Refugees' Asylum Quest, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 1998, at B5 (quoting Leonard S. Glickman, Executive Vice President of the He-
brew Immigrant Aid Society in Manhattan).
17. A felony is "[a] crime of a graver or more serious nature than those designated as
misdemeanors; e.g., aggravated assault (felony) as contrasted with simple assault
(misdemeanor)." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 617 (6th ed. 1991). Thus, felonies are consid-
ered to be serious crimes. In 1988, Congress further distinguished such crimes and created,
for the first time, the category of aggravated felony. See Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4469 (1988) (defining "aggravated felony"). This was done largely
to weed out the "worst criminals" for special punishment and treatment under the law. See
Kari Converse, Criminal Law Reform: Defending Immigrants in Peril, CHAMPION, Aug. 21, 1997,
at 10, 11.
FALL19981
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952.1 The amendment reclassifies
most traditional felonies as aggravated felonies.' 9 Previously, only
murder, drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, and crimes of vio-
lence punishable by imprisonment of at least five years were
aggravated felonies.2 ° The IIRIRA adds to the definition of aggra-
vated felony thefts, burglaries, crimes of violence punishable by a
sentence exceeding one year, rape, sexual abuse of a minor,
money laundering, fraud or tax evasion of $10,000 or more, kid-
napping, child pornography, RICO offenses, pimping, and
document trafficking.2' This new definition of aggravated felonies
applies retroactively.
22
This broad reform will cause a significantly greater number of
immigrants who have been convicted of crimes to suffer grave con-
sequences. ' For political asylum seekers, removal based on this
expanded definition of aggravated felony could mean death upon
24return to their homeland.
2. Retroactive Application-The most troublesome aspect of
section 321 (a) is its retroactive application. Consider a hypotheti-
cal case. An alien comes to the United States in 1990 from his
homeland, seeking refuge from political or religious persecution.
One day, he takes a ride with a friend who, unbeknownst to him,
has a gun and a large amount of marijuana in the trunk of his car.
The police pull the friend over for speeding, discover the drugs
and the gun, and arrest both men in the car. The refugee's court-
appointed lawyer convinces him to cooperate with the authorities
and plead guilty to the felony charges to avoid jail time. The refu-
gee, no expert in American criminal law, agrees and receives a
suspended sentence. He now has a felony on his record.
18. The INA (also called the McCarran-Walter Act or McCarren Act) was signed into
law on June 27, 1952. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) [hereinafter INA]. The purpose of the INA was to: (1) provide for deportation of
aliens convicted in the U.S. of certain criminal offenses; (2) afford aliens judicial procedure
in both exclusion and deportation proceedings while maintaining the national security and
the protection of the social and economic welfare of the American public; and (3) remove
any fear that certain religious, racial, or political persecutees would be arbitrarily excluded
from this country. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 82-2096 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1753, 1754.
19. SeeIIRIRIA 321(a) (3); Converse, supra note 17, at 11.
20. See Converse, supra note 17, at 11.
21. See IIRIRA § 321 (a) (3); Id. at 11-12. The legislative history and the text of the
IIRIRA both state that "[tihe amendments made by this section shall apply on or after the
date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of when the conviction occurred .... H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 104-828, at 84 (1996). See discussion infra Part I.A.2 about retroactive appli-
cation of the new definition of aggravated felony.
22. SeeIIRIRA§ 321 (a) (3).
23. See Converse, supra note 17, at 12.
24. See id.
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Before the enactment of the IIRIRA, the Attorney General had
discretion to withhold deportation of this alien if deportation
would put him in imminent peril.2 ' Under IIRIRA sections 305 and
321, the Attorney General no longer has the discretion to withhold
deportation, because a convicted aggravated felon is considered a
per se threat to the American community.2 6 Due to the expanded
definition of aggravated felony and the removal of discretion from
the Attorney General in cases involving criminal aliens, this inno-
cent man will be returned to his homeland to face the persecution
from which he fled. Seven years after he pleads guilty to a crime he
did not commit, he is sent home.
The INS may identify an alien believed to be statutorily eligible
for removal,27 charge that alien with deportability as an aggravated
felon, and decide whether to issue a final order of removal or refer
the alien for removal proceedings, while offering only a brief op-
28portunity to rebut the charges. This process makes the INS the
only decisionmaker and usually occurs while aliens are incarcer-
ated and have little access to legal counsel, translators, or
immigration information.2 9 The Attorney General's gatekeeping
power (discretion to withhold deportation) has been removed as a
procedural protection for such aliens. After passage of the IIRIRA,
the power to deport lies squarely in the hands of the INS. °
Congress intended to rid the country of illegal aliens who were
committing crimes and imposing costs on the U.S. criminal justice
system. It is difficult to believe, however, that Congress contem-
plated returning asylum seekers, such as the refugee in the
example above, to persecution.
25. See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 413(f), 110 Stat. 1214, 1269, (1996). If an
alien's freedom or life would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion in the country to which the alien
would be deported, the Attorney General could withhold deportation prior to the IIRIRA.
See id.
26. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 305, 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 602, 627-28.
27. There are many ways that the INS may institute deportation proceedings against
an alien. For instance, some aliens could enter the U.S. as visitors and remain here longer
than permitted. In such instances, the INS will either offer voluntary departure or com-
mence deportation proceedings against the alien. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421,
424 (1987) (discussing why deportation proceedings were commenced against a Nicara-
guan citizen living illegally in the United States); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 409 (1984)
(discussing circumstances under which INS came to initiate deportation proceedings
against a Yugoslovian citizen).
28. See Susan L. Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal Proceedings and the Alien De-
fendant, 50 ARK. L. Rzv. 269, 287 (1997) (discussing this power of the INS).
29. See id.
30. See id. (arguing that the prosecuting agency is now the final decisionmaker in de-
portation cases).
31. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828, at 1 (1996).
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B. IIRIRA Section 305
1. The Law-Under the INA and AEDPA, the Attorney
General of the United States had the discretion to withhold the
deportation of criminal aliens in certain instances. 2 Prior to the
enactment of the IIRIRA, refugees were protected from forced re-
turn to countries where they faced threats to life or freedom.3
Section 305 of the IIRIRA curtailed this discretion and invoked
automtic . 34
automatic deportation. Section 305 states that an alien who has
been convicted of an aggravated felony (as newly defined in
IIRIRA section 321) is now deemed a per se danger to the Ameri-
can public and is therefore ineligible for relief from the Attorney
General.35
2. IIRIRA Section 305 Violates International Law-The United
States breaches international law by enforcing section 305. The
United States has violated specific provisions of at least two refugee
conventions: the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees 6 and the 1951 United Nations Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees37 (the provisions of which were
adopted by the United States through the 1967 Refugee Protocol),
along with the 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment.
38
The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Convention) extends protections to international refu-
gees.3 9 The Convention defines a "refugee" as an individual who
32. SeeAEDPA, § 413(f), 110 Stat. 1214, 1269 (1996).
33. See AEDPA § 413(f) (protecting refugees from forced return to countries where
they face a threat to life or freedom). This provision temporarily fulfills the United States'
international obligations as established under the United Nations Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (of which the U.S. is signatory).
34. See IIRIRA § 305 (a).
35. See IIRIRA § 305 (stating that "an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated
felony (or felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of impris-
onment of at least 5 years shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious
crime").
36. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225,
606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol] (adopting Articles 2 through 34[2] of
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees).
37. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
38. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
39. See Refugee Convention, supra note 37; see also Bobbie Marie Guerra, A Tortured
Construction: The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act's Express Bar Deny-
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has a well-founded fear of persecution in his or her country of ori-
gin based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." The Convention establishes
what is known as the obligation of nonrefoulement 4 Under the prin-
ciple of nonrefoulement, no contracting nation shall return a person
classified as a refugee to a country where his life or freedom is
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
41in a particular social group, or political opinions.
Article 1(F) of the Convention contains a list of activities that
prohibit one from gaining refugee status.4 3 Article 33(2) of the
Convention allows a contracting nation to return a refugee to his
home country if he has been convicted of a "particularly serious
crime"' 4 and has been found to constitute a danger to the commu-
nity, even if that person faces persecution upon return to the
home country.5 Commentators have suggested that the drafters of
the Convention attempted to balance the interests of countries in
securing the safety of their communities and the interests of refu-
gees in escaping persecution in their homelands. 6
In 1968, the United States signed the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Protocol) , which
adopted the minimum standards of protection developed under
ing Criminal Aliens Withholding of Deportation Defies the Principles of International Law, 28 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 941, 951-52 (1997) (stating that the convention arose out of increasing interna-
tional concerns for refugees due to events surrounding World War II).
40. See Refugee Convention, supra note 37, at art. 1, para. A, 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189
U.N.T.S. at 152.
41. See id.
42. See Guerra, supra note 39, at 954. Guerra notes, however, that the nonrefoulment ob-
ligation is not mandatory in certain circumstances. See also infra note 39 and accompanying
text.
43. See Refugee Convention, supra note 37, at art. 1, para. F, 19 U.S.T. at 6263-64, 189
U.N.T.S. at 156. These activities include committing war crimes or acting contrary to the
purposes of the Convention.
44. Unfortunately, there is no internationally recognized definition of a "particularly
serious crime." In In reFrentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 246 (B.I.A. June 23, 1982), the Board
of Immigration Appeals attempted to set forth the factors to be considered by courts (on a
case-by-case basis) to determine whether a crime is a "particularly serious crime." The four
factors follow: (1) the nature of the crime; (2) the circumstances and underlying facts of the
conviction; (3) the type of sentence imposed; and (4) the degree of dangerousness the
alien poses to the community. See id. at *8; see also Guerra, supra note 39, at 959. Many
crimes that would not meet the definition of "particularly serious crime" are considered
aggravated felonies under the IIRIRA.
45. See Refugee Convention, supra note 37, at art. 33, para. 2; Guerra, supra note 39, at
954-55.
46. See Guerra, supra note 39, at 955 n.4. Thus, the argument continues, deportation
determinations should balance these interests on a case-by-case basis rather than use formal-
istic, objective criteria that the United States has adopted under IIRIRA § 305.
47. Refugee Protocol, supra note 36; see also Guerra, supra note 39, at 956.
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Article 33(1) of the Convention. A nation becoming a party to
the Refugee Protocol agrees to afford protections to refugees as
required by Article 33(1) of the Convention. 49 By signing on to the
Refugee Protocol, ° the United States adopted Article 33(1) and
agreed to withhold the deportation of refugees who could face
imminent persecution in their homelands unless they fit into the
Article 33(2) exception.5"
By eliminating the Attorney General's discretion to withhold
deportation of aliens convicted of aggravated felonies, Congress
has ensured-that the new U.S. immigration law conflicts with the
terms of Article 33(1) of the Convention and violates the protec-
tion of refugees (criminal or not) as required by the 1967 Refugee
Protocol. Other signatories to the refugee conventions may follow
the lead of the United States and deny refugees similar protec-
tions. The United States sets a poor example for the rest of the
world by violating the terms of international conventions that pro-
scribe this legislation.
In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the 1980 amendments to the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) violated Article 33 of the
Convention and whether Article 33 has an extraterritorial effect
and can be applied to refugees captured before they actually en-
tered the United States.52 While the majority concluded that Article
33 did not preclude the INS from returning refugees captured
outside U.S. borders to their homelands, Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent states that Article 33 of the Refugee Convention creates a
straightforward obligation on the part of signatory states not to
"expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
48. See Refugee Protocol, supra note 36 (adopting the fundamental principals of the
Refugee Convention).
49. See Refugee Protocol, supra note 36, art. I, para. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S.
at 268.
50. The United States agreed to comply with the substantive provisions of Articles 2
through 34 of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees when
it signed on to the 1967 Protocol. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429 (1987)
(citing 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6259-6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968)). Although the United States is
not a signatory to the 1951 Convention itself, in acceding to the 1967 Refugee Protocol, it
bound itself to comply with Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 169 n.19 (1993) (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,416 (1984)).
51. In other words, by acceding to the Refugee Protocol, the United States has agreed
to uphold the principle of nonrefoulement, embodied in Article 33 of the Refugee Conven-
tion and adopted in the Refugee Protocol.
52. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 156. This brief discussion of the 1980 Amendments is being
used as an analogy. Justice Blackmun's reasoning can be applied to the discussion at hand.
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threatened.",3 Under Justice Blackmun's interpretation of Article
33, the United States violates the terms of the Convention by ex-
pelling refugees already within its borders. By enacting IIRIRA
section 305 and allowing the INS to return refugees to "territories
where [their lives or freedoms] would be threatened,"04 following
Blackman's interpretation, Congress and the Executive Branch
violate international law.
The new immigration laws also violate the 1984 Torture Con-
vention which the United States has signed.55 The principle of
nonrefoulement is expressed in Article 3 of the United Nations Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. 56 Signatories to this convention have
agreed to withhold the deportation of individuals who are in sub-
stantial danger of being subjected to torture.57 IIRIRA section 305
violates this nonrefoulement provision in the same way that it violates
Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention.
C. IIRIRA Sections 301 and 302
Under the INA, the legal rights of aliens meeting the statutory
requirements for removal depended on whether they were classi-
fied as "deportable" or "excludable" aliens. 5 Aliens who entered
the United States, whether through lawful means or otherwise,
were treated as "deportable."59 Once deemed "deportable" by the
INS, aliens had extensive procedural protections before and dur-
ing the course of removal. 0 In contrast, aliens who had not yet
entered the country were labeled "excludable" and received fewer
61procedural protections than their deportable counterparts.
53. Id. at 190 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (citing Article 33.1 of Refugee Convention).
54. Id. at 192.
55. See Torture Convention, supra note 38; Guerra, supra note 39, at 969 (discussing
possible violations).
56. Torture Convention, supra note 38.
57. See Guerra, supra note 39, at 971 ("Article 3 of the Torture Convention states that a
country cannot expel, return, or extradite an individual to a State where he or she would be
in danger of being tortured.") (citing Torture Convention, art. 3).
58. See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et. seq.; Jones, supra note 5, at 917-18 (discussing the
rights of"deportable," as compared to "excludable," aliens).
59. See id.
60. See id.; Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (stating
that aliens who have entered the United States, even illegally, "may be expelled only after
proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of
law").
61. See id.
FALL 1998]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
"Deportable" aliens had the right to advanced notice of charges
against them and to a hearing before an immigration judge where
the burden of proof was placed on the government. 62 Additionally,
"deportable" aliens were entitled to federal appellate review of fi-
nal deportation orders entered against them.3 Thus, "deportable"
aliens were afforded a reasonable chance of a fair determination.
Section 302 of the newly-enacted IIRIRA amends the INA to give
INS agents the power to deport some classes of aliens without a
64trial or even an administrative hearing. In many instances, when
the alien faces no credible fear of persecution upon deportation,
all the INS must do is grant the alien a brief screening interview
with no opportunity for appeal. 65 The new procedure is referred to
as "summary exclusion" or "expedited removal."66
As the law now stands, "no court shall have jurisdiction to review
... any individual determination or to entertain any other cause or
claim," arising from the enacted removal process.67 The deportable
alien no longer has the right to federal appellate review, and fed-
eral appellate courts no longer have the jurisdiction to enter
relief.68 Though there were two classes of aliens who received two
different levels of procedural due process rights under the INA,69
the IIRIRA lumps the "excludable" and the "deportable" aliens
into one class of aliens with little or no chance of obtaining proce-
dural due process. The INS may now expel or refuse to admit
aliens without regard to the procedural rights that were historically
granted to aliens.7°
Section 301 of the IIRIRA also authorizes INS agents to summa-
rily remove "excludable" aliens found in the United States and
restricts judicial review of those determinations. 7 Thus, both provi-
62. See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et. seq.;Jones, supra note 5, at 918 (citing 3AAM.JUR. 2D
Aliens and Citizens § 1249 (1986)).
63. See3AAM.JuR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 1247 (1986).
64. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 302, 110 Star. 3009-546, 581 (1997).
65. See id.
66. See Carol Leslie Wolchok, Demands and Anxiety: The Effects of the New Immigration
Law, 24 HuM. RTS., Spring 1997, at 12 (summarizing the changes in IIRIRA and its impact
on the legal and immigrant communities); see also Ojito, supra note 16, at BI (stating that
since the new law took effect, the INS has detained all asylum seekers upon arrival in this
country and required them to go through a procedure called "expedited removal").
67. Jones, supra note 5, at 920 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a) (2) (A)).
68. See Skutnick v. INS, 128 F.3d 512, 514 (1997) (holding that the court no longer has
jurisdiction to provide the requested relief); discussion infra Part II.
69. See Foster, supra note 6, at 224 (stating that the "INA granted a number of privi-
leges to aliens in deportation proceedings not accorded to aliens in exclusion
proceedings").
70. See id. at 228.
71. SeeJones, supra note 5, at 921.
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sions increase the chance that refugees and asylum seekers will be
forcefully returned to face persecution in their homelands.
D. AEDPA Section 440(a) and IIRIRA Section 306
1. The Law-AEDPA section 440(a), amending section
106(a) (1) of the INA, states that "[a]ny final order of deportation
against an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed
a criminal offense ... shall not be subject to review by any court."72
This new provision is analogous to IIRIRA section 302 in that it
denies aliens access to U.S. courts to seek review of deportation
orders. Section 440(a) precludes all forms of judicial review, in-
73
cluding habeas corpus review.
Section 306 of the IIRIRA further amends INA section
106(a) (1). It states that "In] otwithstanding any other provision of
law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of
removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having
committed a criminal offense., 74 The effect of section 306 is to fur-
ther restrictjudicial review of INS orders removing criminal aliens.
Both provisions suggest a Congressional intent to punish aliens
and limit their rights in the United States.
2. Provisions Violate U.S. Constitutional Law---Traditionally,
aliens facing deportation or exclusion from the United States had
recourse to habeas corpus challenges to determine the legality of
their removal or exclusion.75 As discussed above, provisions of the
IIRIRA and AEDPA regarding the removal and exclusion of aliens
preclude judicial review.6
The United States Supreme Court has determined that admis-
sion into the United States is a privilege rather than a right.
7
Aliens who have already entered the United States, however, tradi-
tionally have had the right to judicial review of INS deportation
72. AEDPA§ 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1276-77 (1996).
73. See Trevor Morrison, Note, Removed from the Constitution? Deportable Aliens' Access to
Habeas Corpus Under the New Immigration Legislation, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 697, 702
(1997).
74. IIRIRA § 306 (a) (2).
75. See Morrison, supra note 73, at 721.
76. See, e.g., AEDPA § 440 and IIRIRA §§ 302, 321 (providing that all final orders of
deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed a criminal
offense shall not be subject to review by any court).
77. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); see also
Jones, supra note 5, at 928 (stating the Supreme Court held in Knauffthat admission into
the United States is a privilege).
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determinations. The Supreme Court stated that " [i] t is well estab-
lished that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of
law in deportation proceedings."' Thus, criminal aliens facing re-
moval from the United States historically have been afforded
habeas corpus relief to challenge the legality of INS determina-
tions. 9
The IIRIRA and AEDPA provisions regarding removal of these
criminal aliens fail to provide aliens procedural due process. Al-
though criminal aliens do not have an automatic right to
admission into the United States, they should have a right to the
same protections that American-born criminals receive once here,
because they receive the same punishments.
II. RECENT CASE LAW AND COURT INTERPRETATION
There is confusion and disagreement between federal appellate
and district courts over the correct interpretations of key provi-
sions of the AEDPA and IIRIRA. s0
In Vargas v. Reno,"' the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of California held that Congress cannot bar deportable aliens
from all avenues of judicial relief.82 Jose Vargas immigrated to the
United States from Mexico in 1969 when he was one month old
and became a legal permanent resident of the United States. 3 His
entire family lives in the United States. Vargas obtained his educa-
tion in the United States.84 In 1991, Vargas was convicted of a
felony sale of marijuana. s After being convicted of two other mis-
demeanor offenses, the INS obtained a deportation order against
him, and he was ordered to show cause why he should not be de-
86ported to Mexico in 1995. An INS immigration judge granted
Vargas' petition for a waiver of deportation, finding that it would
78. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).
79. See Morrison, supra note 73, at 721.
80. This discussion is by no means exhaustive and the reader should not assume that
the opinions below are representative of those of the entire federal judiciary.
81. 966 F. Supp 1537 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that aliens have a right not to be de-
ported without due process of law, which "can only be guaranteed if there is judicial review
of deportees' constitutional claims").
82. See id. at 1541.
83. See id. at 1540.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
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be too harsh to deport Vargas because he had lived in the United
States his entire life and because all of his family lived here.87
The INS appealed the decision. Seven months later, the AEDPA
was signed into law. Following AEDPA section 440, which applies
retroactively to exclude aliens convicted of certain felony offenses
from waiver of deportation petitions,88 the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) ordered Vargas' deportation. 9 Vargas filed suit in
U.S. District Court to enjoin the government from deporting him,
seeking a declaration that AEDPA section 440 should not be ap-
plied retroactively and that section 440 was unconstitutional.90
The District Court found that "[a]liens have a Fifth Amendment
right not to be deported without due process of law, and this can
only be guaranteed if there is judicial review of deportees' consti-
tutional claims."3' The Court further stated that "Congress must
not have intended to suspend the right of aliens in imminent dan-
ger of deportation to petition the courts for a writ of habeas
corpus."92 Finally, the court held that AEDPA section 440 does not
preclude courts from reviewing plaintiffs' constitutional claims
upon a petition for writ of habeas corpus.93
However, in Exoum v. INS,94 the Fifth Circuit held that it lacked
jurisdiction under the IIRIRA to review claims for discretionary
relief.9 5 Since the BIA had entered its final order in the alien's case
in November of 1996, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to
review the alien's claim that the BIA erred in denying his request
not to be deported.96 The court bowed to the new legislation and
prevented the immigrant from seeking review of the INS determi-
nations against him.
In Elboukili v. INS,97 the Tenth Circuit upheld a final order of the
INS denying an immigrant's application for asylum or withholding
of deportation. 9 The court stated that the IIRIRA altered the
"availability, scope, and nature of judicial review in INS cases," but
that because the alien's proceeding began before April 1, 1997
(the date that the IIRIRA was signed into law and became
87. See id. at 1539.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 1541.
92. Id. at 1542.
93. See id.
94. 125 F.3d 889, 891 (5th Cir. 1997).
95. See id. at 891.
96. See id.
97. No. 97-9529, 1997 WL 616222 (10th Cir. Oct. 7, 1997).
98. See id. at *1.
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effective), judicial review was appropriate in this case."" Although
the court reviewed this INS determination, it made clear that the
IIRIRA would prohibit review of decisions made after April 1,
1997.10
In Skutnick v. INS,"°1 the Seventh Circuit stated that the IIRIRA
made significant changes to the availability of judicial review and
required that "there shall be no appeal of any discretionary deci-
sion under [certain sections of the INA].... ,,102 An alien appealed
an INS decision to deport him, claiming that "deportation would
work an extreme hardship" by splitting up his family or by requir-
ing him to relocate." 3 The court rejected the alien's argument that
the Fifth Amendment entitled aliens to judicial review of all INS
determinations and stated that the IIRIRA's preclusion of judicial
review of INS decisions was constitutional.0 4 The alien's petition
was dismissed, his deportation order remained, and the new legis-
lation was upheld.
As of late 1998, the Supreme Court has not addressed the valid-
ity of this legislation and the courts are clearly confused as to the
state of the law. Courts have ruled that they lack jurisdiction to re-
view orders of deportation under the AEDPA and IIRIRA.' 5 Other
courts have held that federal courts retain jurisdiction to hear im-
migrants' claims.0 6 However, these same decisions glossed over the
constitutionality of the legislation and were decided on other
107grounds. Until the Supreme Court has ruled on the validity of
this legislation, its constitutionality will remain in question.
99. Id. at *1 n.1.
100. See id.
101. 128 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting IIRIRA § 309(c) (4) (e)).
102. Id. at 513-514.
103. Id. at 513.
104. See id. at 514.
105. See Dashto v. INS, Nos. 97-1258, 97-1262, 1997 WL 577573, at *I (7th Cir. Sept. 12,
1997) (holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to review the INS order of deportation
"when the alien requesting review was found deportable for having committed two or more
crimes of moral turpitude not arising from a single scheme of criminal conduct and has
been ordered to serve a prison term of one year or more").
106. See Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the District
Court retained jurisdiction under its general habeas corpus powers to hear the immigrants'
challenge to the retroactive application of the AEDPA provision barring legal residents
convicted of certain crimes from seeking discretionary waiver of deportation).
107. See id. at 182 (deciding that petitioners' equal protection claims should be dis-
missed as unnecessary for the disposition of the case at hand).
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III. REFORM
Although some courts have stated that the AEDPA leaves habeas
corpus relief intact and that the new legislation does not infringe
upon constitutional rights,' 8 there is clearly a need for reform. 0 9
The laws, created to lower the costs of illegal immigration in this
country, are too far reaching. The effects of the legislation create
economic, social, and safety concerns for those seeking refuge in
the United States.
Consider the true case of an Albanian asylum seeker who
claimed to have been gang-raped in Albania in retaliation for her
husband's refusal to fight for the Government. She fled to the
United States in May of 1997." While being detained in New Jer-
sey, she failed to convince immigration officials that she had a
good chance to win asylum."' The immigration officer who inter-
viewed the woman before deportation determined that she had no
credible fear of persecution, because she could not identify the
men who raped her (she was blindfolded at the time of the at-
tack). 12 The immigration judge who screened her also found no
credible fear of persecution, although he did not substantively dis-
cuss the case with the woman's lawyer." 3 The woman was deported
to Albania and was later found "dishelved and forlorn, on a street
near the airport in Tirana, the capital of Albania, after her flight
from Newark landed.""14 She was hidden by a generous family and
was afraid to contact anyone in her own family in fear that the men
who raped her would come after her again."5 This woman should
not have been deported from the United States. She should have
been entitled, at the very least, to federal appellate review of the
INS determination to remove her.
108. See Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785, 790 (lst Cir. 1996) (noting the position of the INS
that the AEDPA repeals habeas relief available in the INA, but leaves relief protected by the
Constitution intact); Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1996)(stating the
same relief is available); Morrison, supra note 73, at 702-04 (stating that a majority of circuit
court decisions upholding AEDPA § 440(a) have held that the section does not remove all
access to habeas corpus relief for deportable aliens).
109. It should be noted that IIRIRA § 306(a), which was enacted months after the deci-
sions regarding the constitutionality of AEDPA § 440(a), discussed supra note 74, further
restricts habeas relief. Thus, one should view these opinions in light of the more recent
reform.
110. SeeDugger, supra note 12, at Al.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See id.
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The laws should be changed to allow judicial review of INS re-
moval determinations. Extreme hardships imposed by the new laws
on many aliens and their families outweigh the costs to American
citizens.16
Congress has an obligation to remedy its mistake, listen to rea-
son, and conform immigration law in the United States to
constitutional and international law. Repeal of the laws in their
entirety would provide aliens with more procedural protections"'
but might result in more public outcry and another set of bad laws.
The better solution is to amend the current law.
Congress should amend the IIRIRA and AEDPA to conform the
laws to the United States' international obligations as established
under the Refugee Convention"" and Refugee Protocol." 9 This
could be easily accomplished by amending IIRIRA section 305 to
give the Attorney General the discretion to withhold deportation.
This small change would allow the Attorney General to enforce the
nonrefoulement provision of Article 33 of the Convention. The At-
torney General could ensure that the United States does not
return a person classified as a refugee to a country where his life or
freedom is threatened.
Congress should also amend IIRIRA section 321 (a) (3) to elimi-
nate the harsh retroactive application of deportation of aggravated
felons. Currently, removal proceedings for aggravated felons are
expedited and reentry is forbidden for 20 years. 2 By eliminating
this retroactive application, Congress could avoid violating refu-
gees' international human rights and their reliance on old
immigration law.
Finally, Congress should reassert federal judicial review of INS
deportation decisions and should ensure that all aliens have the
right to trials and/or administrative hearings. By eliminating the
summary exclusion procedures of IIRIRA section 302, Congress
can guarantee that the INS does not circumvent aliens' rights to
procedural due process. By amending section 306 of the IIRIRA
116. See Underwood, supra note 3, at 926.
117. If the new laws were repealed or struck down by the Supreme Court, procedural
protections, such as a return of the withholding discretion of the Attorney General and the
right to federal judicial review of deportation decisions (as prescribed by the INA and im-
migration legislation enacted before the AEDPA and IIRIRA), would be returned to many
classes of aliens who are now being denied such protections, as this Note has discussed.
Total repeal might lead to public outrage, however, which was the impetus of the original
enactment of the legislation. See Underwood, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that it was public
backlash against the growing population of illegal residents that prompted the legislation).
118. See Refugee Convention, supra note 37.
119. See Refugee Protocol, supra note 36.
120. See Converse, supra note 17, at 12.
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and section 440(a) of the AEDPA, Congress can ensure that all ali-
ens have the right to seek review of deportation orders in U.S.
courts.
The primary reason that these laws were adopted was to deter il-
legal immigration to the United States by (1) increasing border
patrols; (2) increasing penalties for smuggling and document
fraud; (3) reforming exclusion and deportation laws; and (4) im-
proving the verification system for eligibility for employment.
21
These measures were aimed at reforming the legal immigration
system and facilitating legal entries into the United States. 122 The
primary purposes need not change. However, the laws need to be
amended where they reflect destructive motives and are punitive,
rather than deterrent, in nature.
CONCLUSION
As American Bar Association Governmental Affairs Director
Robert D. Evans wrote to members of the House and Senate and to
President Clinton immediately before the final passage of the legis-
lation, "[the new legislation] abandons the U.S. commitment to
the protection of refugees seeking asylum, threatens basic safe-
guards of due process, and eliminates the historic role for [sic] the
judiciary in reviewing the implementation of the immigration
laws. '2 3 Congress ignored this warning. The laws need to be re-
formed. This is not a cry for a total repeal or an extensive overhaul
of U.S. immigration law. This is simply a call for reason. The three
changes suggested above would provide aliens the U.S. Constitu-
tional and international law protections they are guaranteed.
121. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828, at 1 (1996) (stating reasons for adopting these
laws).
122. See id.
123. Wolchok, supra note 66, at 13.
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